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ulation of infin itely l ived Bayesian agents choose consumption and migration decis ion 
rules as a function of their histories. The agents do not know the production functions 
in the two sectors and learn about them through wage draws that they rece ive from the 
stochastic production functions. The government knows the true production functions 
but is uninformed about the agents' bel iefs, and the actual wage draws they observe. 
The government maximizes its welfare function- using wage subs id ies in the two sectors, 
and a migration tax. We solve the agents' dynamic programming problem, and then use 
the solution to solve the government's dynamic programming problem. We study the 
effects of government pol ic ies on the population distr ibution, and illustrate the model by 
numerically solv ing a particular parametric example. 
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A Dynamic Migration Model with Uncertainty 
Mahmoud A. El-Gamal • 
1 Introduction
The Harr is-Todaro model {1970) of labor migration may still be the most influential model 
in the development l iterature. A number of extens ions and var iations have been offered 
within its static context (e.g. Bhagwati and Srinivasan {1974), Stiglitz (1974), Corden 
and F indlay {1975), Calvo (1978), Khan (1980), Lundborg {1990), McCool (1982), to 
name but a few). Migration models with uncertainty and/or of dynamic nature have 
mostly been on the micro ( indiv idual) level (e.g. Djiajic (1989), Pess ino (1991), and 
Pollachek and Horvath (1978)), or concentrated on steady state equilibria (e.g. Galor 
(1986)). On the macro level, however, the spirit of modeling and pol icy prescr iptions in 
the l iterature remains mainly t ied to the Harr is-Todaro static setting w ith deterministic 
product ion functions, and full information on the agents' and the government's s ide. 
This paper has the modest purpose of developing a general (and yet computable) 
model in the spirit of the original Harris-Todaro model, with two main d ifferences. The 
first d ifference is adding a stochastic component to production together w ith adding un­
certainty on the agents' as well as the government's s ide. The second var iation we include 
is a fully dynamic sett ing w ith a finite population that uses optimal ( Bayesian) updating 
procedures to learn the true production functions in the rural and urban sectors, while 
at the same t ime maximizing the d iscounted sum of a stream of l ifetime ut il ities from 
consumption. The government takes the solutions of the agents' dynamic programming 
problem as a pr imitive, and proceeds to maximize its own discounted stream of soc ial wel­
fare as it learns about the d istribut ion of beliefs in the population through the observed 
migrat ion patterns. 
The target of the paper agrees with the bulk of the above referenced static models 
in analyz ing government polic ies of d istribut ing wage subs idies and imposing migra­
t ion taxes (poss ibly prohibitively h igh) to obtain a first best d istr ibution of population 
• This paper was presented at the SEDC summer meetings in Montreal, June 1992. I wish to
thank the participants in the conference, especially Thomas Sargent, for their helpful comments. I also 
wish to thank two anonymous referees and the editor of JEDC (Ber� Rustem) for insisting on explicit
policy analysis, which has significantly improved the paper. Finally, I wish to thank the Jet Propulsion
Laboratory for giving me access to their Cray YMP2E/116. 
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between the two sectors. Within our dynamic setting, we introduce a social welfare 
function which the government wishes to maximize using the wage subsidy and migra­
tion tax policy tools. We show that, under simplifying assumptions, an equilibrium to 
the government/population game exists. The agent's dynamic program gives rise to an 
optimal migration rule which the government can then use to formulate beliefs about 
migration patterns in the future. The government uses the latter beliefs to construct 
its own well defined dynamic program which allows for an optimal rule of setting wage 
subsidies and migration taxes as a function of the current population distribution and 
government beliefs about the distribution of agent beliefs. The setting of the model is 
general enough to allow for a large class of production functions, agent utility functions, 
and government welfare functions. 
In section 2, we introduce the model at the individual level and demonstrate that 
the individual's dynamic programming problem is well defined and gives rise to a well 
defined optimal migration rule. In section 3, we study that optimal migration rule and 
derive the micro-dynamics summarized by each agent's transition probability matrix 
between the sectors as a function of that agent's belief, the population distribution, and 
the announced subsidy and migration tax levels. In section 4 we derive the resulting 
aggregate dynamics in the form of the government's probability transition matrix for 
the population as a function of the government's beliefs on agent beliefs. In section 
4, we also derive the government's updating rule for its beliefs on generic agent beliefs 
as the population distribution changes due to migration. In section 5, we demonstrate 
that the government's dynamic welfare maximization problem is itself well defined, and 
hence that the optimal tax and subsidy policy is well defined. In section 6, we establish, 
under further simplifying conditions, the effects of the various government policies on 
population dynamics, as well as the need for government intervention. In section 7, we 
provide a simple numerical example to demonstrate how the optimal subsidy and tax 
function can be found. The parameterization of our numerical example was chosen in 
the spirit of the Harris-Todaro model and is used to illustrate the effect of the dynamic 
and uncertainty features of our model. 
2 Description of the model
The economy has N infinitely lived agents and two sectors (labelled r and u for rural and 
urban, resp.). In the beginning of each period, agents decide on their level of consumption 
for the period (subject to some budget constraints) and the sector in which they will work 
during this period. They consume the chosen amount, then they migrate if necessary. 
After that, they work in the designated sector, and then receive their wages in that sector. 
At the time the agents receive their wages, they are also informed of the population 
distribution for this period. The government, on the other hand, observes the migration 
of the workers, and collects a pre-specified migration tax. After the workers have settled 
in the sector of their choice for that time period and started working, the government 
observes the population distribution and decides on next period's migration tax as well 
as the current period's wage subsidies for the two sectors, which are distributed at the 
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time the workers receive their wages. The time structure of the model is described by 
Figure 1. 
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At this point, it would help to introduce some notation. For each agent, let w; denote
the wage received in sector i in period t, let ct denote the level of consumption chosen in
period t, and let lt denote the location (sector) in which that agent decides to work in 
period t. We shall use lt E { r, u} for superscripts, and give it the numerical values r = 1, 
u = 0 in equations. We use N[ to denote the population in the rural sector in period t, 
and Nt = N - N[ to denote the population in the urban sector during that period. We
shall denote the wage subsidies in the rural and urban sectors in period t by sr and sf '
respectively. The migration tax for period t is denoted by Tt·
The wages are assumed to be determined stochastically via production functions that 
depend on the population distribution Nr and Nu and some unknown parameters or and
ou. In reduced form we write the wage distributions as follows: 
where the dependence on N[ and Nt should account for any returns to scale consid­
erations, and 0 = (or' ou) is some technological parameter unknown to the agents but
known to the government. The support of pr(.; ., .) and Fu(.; ., .) is assumed to be the
set W = [O, w]. In what follows, we shall assume that pr and pu have densities F and
ju respectively. The government chooses subsidies sr , sf from the set S = [O, s], and
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migration tax Tt from the set [O, f]. We assume that sand f are preset to satisfy some
social and/or legal restrictions. 
When making their decisions, the agents are assumed to be boundedly rational in 
two senses. First, they assume that the population distribution will stay the same in 
the next period and that their decision to migrate or not to migrate cannot influence 
that. Secondly, they assume that the subsidy levels in both sectors, and the migration 
tax, will be the same in the next period as they have been in the current period. We 
shall discuss the technical and substantive reasons for making those assumptions in the 
remarks following the mathematical definition of the dynamic programming problem. 
The agent's problem is thus: 
00 
max Eo I: ,Btu( Ct) 
{le,ct} t=O 
s.t. 0 $Ct $ w!'..:"i + s!'..:"i - Ttllt - lt-11
lt E { r, u} = { 1, 0} 
w�,..., Fr(dw;fr,N;_1) 
w; ,..., Fu( dw; OU, Nt1:_1) 
Sr _ Sr t - t-1 
Tt+1 = Tt
I ltA;(dO)r(wr; 0, N[)
A�+i(
A) =AI Ni(dO)Jr(wr;O,N[) + (l - lt)A�(A)
er 
where A is a Borel subset of C:Y, B is a Borel subset of 9u, and A; and Af are the agent's
beliefs in period t about or and ou' respectively. The problem, thus, reduces to the simple
dynamic program (where� stands for Bayesian updating):
s.t. 
max f:,at �j j jju (lt(w� + sD + (1 - lt)(w; + s;) - Ttllt - lt-11){ltE{r,u}} t-O - r eu w w 
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J Zt>-r(de)r(wr; e, N;) 
>-�+1(A) =AI >.t(dO)Jr(wr;B,N[) + (l - lt)>.;(A) = �(>.;,N;,w;,Zt)(A)
er 
Remarks 
• Notice that different workers in the same sector are allowed to get different random
draws from the wage distribution. This is more general than the Harris-Todaro
model. The analysis below will be slightly easier if we force all workers within a
sector to receive the same wage. Notice, moreover, that unemployment is a special
case of this specification where the distribution of wages has an atom at zero wage,
in which case the subsidies also serve as unemployment benefits.
• To form rational beliefs about N[, Nt", s;, and sf would involve solving the govern­
ment's problem as well, which is too much to require from our agents. We believe
that the bounded rationality assumption that their migration decision (and their
new observations) do not affect the population distribution is quite reasonable. In­
deed, this assumption is in the same spirit of the Harris-Todaro assumption that
agents know their expected wage in the other sector when they decide to migrate.
This implies either their knowledge of the population distribution in the next pe­
riod, or their assumption that the population distribution will remain unchanged.
Since the former implication leads to more technical complications (see next re­
mark), we resort to the latter.
• On a more technical note, if we let agents form beliefs about the beliefs of the other
agents in order to form a distribution of possible migration patterns, their own
decision to migrate will now depend on their beliefs about the other agents' beliefs.
It is clear that this will lead to infinite regress (beliefs on beliefs on ... ) whose
dynamics can be very complicated (e.g. see El-Gama! (1992)). In this paper, those
problems are bypassed by this bounded rationality assumption.
• More complications can be added to the model. For example, the wage distribution
could be made to depend on the person's tenure/experience in the sector fr =
l:�=o lp and Ef = t - E;. We could also assign different agents different types and
make the distribution of wages depend on the types. These complications'will only
expand our state space, but the message of the paper will remain unchanged.
• To solve the simplest model presented by the above dynamic program, notice that
our state space is defined by the vector Ut-1' Tt, w!t_:f, St-1' N[_1, At)· Given last
period's subsidy St-1 = (s; _u sf_1) in both sectors, last period's population distri­
bution (N[_1, Nt"__1), and this period's belief about (Or, 0"), defined by (>.;, >.r), the
agent chooses lt and consumes whatever is left of the wage and subsidy less the
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travelling cost Tt if any travel is required in this period. The person works in the
chosen sector, and then is informed of her wage, the subsidy levels for period t, and 
the population distribution in that period. Based on that information, the agent 
uses Bayes' rule to update her beliefs about the O's, and proceeds to observe Tt+i
and choose lt+I, and so on.
• It is clear that the dynamic program defined above has a bounded reward function
E[ u(.)], a finite action space { r, u}, and a weakly continuous state transition kernel(due to the well known continuity of the Bayes updating map; see Easley and
Kiefer (1988) or El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993) for details). Hence, by a well
known result of Maitra (1968), the value function written below is well defined,
and allows a measurable optimal selection (migration rule).
The Bellman's equation for that simple dynamic program is defined by: 
(l lt-1 r u Nr \ ) V t-1, Tt, Wt-1 l St-ll St-ll t-ll At = 
m,�x u(lt-1(w�_1 + s�_1) + (l - lt-1)(wf_1 + sf_1) - Ttllt - lt-11)+ 
j j j j [(3 v( lti Tt, w�t, s�_1, sf_1, N[_1, �( ,,\�t, Nf:1, w�t, l,))] 
er eu w w 
Fr(dwr ·or Nr ) Fu(dwu· (}u Nu ) ,,\r(dOr) ,,\ u(dOu) t' ' t-1 t ' ' t-1 
which is recursively well defined by the unique fixed point of the above contraction 
mapping. The set of optimands defines our optimal migration rule. 
In the next section, we shall solve for the micro dynamics of boundedly rational agents 
facing the problem that we have defined. In the following sections, the government will 
be assumed to observe the economy and have a welfare function which increases with the 
earnings of the agents and decreases with the budget deficit. The government will be 
allowed to monitor the migration of agents, and charge a pre-announced migration tax. 
After the migration season is over, the government fine-tunes the system by deciding 
on and distributing wage subsidies in the two sectors. The government knows the true 
values (or•' (JU*). It is, on the other hand, ignorant of the agents' beliefs about the O's
and has to learn about them through the agents' migration patterns. The government
cannot identify different agents and keep any information about their histories and/or
actual wage draws. 
3 Micro..:Dynamics
In this section, we define the optimal migration rule and then we use it to derive the 
micro stochastic dynamics. We start by defining the following events: 
E1 = f j j[u(w+s"_1)+f3v(r,w,s"_1,s':..1,N':..1,�(,,\r,Nr:_1,w,r))] Fr(dw;Or,N':._1) .-\r(dOr) 
�r w  
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<: j j [u( w+s�1-r )+f3v( r, w, s:,, s�1, N�1, !B(A", N�1, w, u))] F"( dw; 8", N�1) A"( dO")} 
eu w 
E2 = f j j[u(w+s':._1)+f3v(r,w,s':._1,s1:..1,N':.1,f13()/,N':_1,w,r))] Fr(dw;(Y,N':.1) )/(dfY) 
ler W 
< j j [u(w+s1:..1-r)+f3v(r, w, s':._1, s1:..1, N�1, f13(>.", N�1, w, u))J F"(dw; 0", N�1) >."(dOu)} 
eu w 
E3 = f j j[u(w+s':._1-r)+f3v(r,w,s"_1,s1:..1,N:1,f13(>.r,N:1,w,r))] Fr(dw;Or,N:1) >.r(dOr) 
ler W 
> J J [u( w + s1:..1) + f3v( T, w, s:._1' s1:._1' N�1' m( >. u' N�l' w, u) )] F"( dw; eu' N�l) >. "( dO")} 
euw 
E4 = f j j[u(w+s':._1-r)+f3v(r,w,s':._1,s1:..1,N':.uf13(>.r,N':_1,w,r))] Fr(dw;fY,N':.1) >.r(dOr) 
ler W . 
� j j [u(w + s1:._1) + {3v( r, w, s':._1, s1:._1, N�1, f13(>.", N�1, w, u))J F"(dw; 0", N�1) >."(dO")} 
euw 
The optimal migration rule is then described by the following table: 
I Table 1 ================;:===;:::;::::::;::===;:=::::::==;:=========� 
I Optimal Migration Rule 
I Location of origin I Event occurs I Location of destination I 
I i I i I r u u 
Given the above derived optimal migration rules, we can directly derive the probability 
transition matrix (from the government's point of view) for a given individual with a 
known belief >. = ( >.r, >." ), and given the previous period's data N[_1, Ntu-1' s�-1' sf_1, 
and the current migration tax Tt. Define the sets of beliefs (where s+J(.) is the space of
probability measures on its argument):
Ai={>. E Sfl(0r) x Sfl(0"): E1 occurs }
A2 = {>. E s+J(0r) x s+J(0"): E2 occurs }
A3 = {>. E Sfl(0r) X Sfl(0u): E3 occurs }
A4 = {>. E s+J(0r) x s+J(0u): E4 occurs }
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Then the transition Probability matrix 
is simply defined by: 
q;;N-1,&-1,T = J
{wr:m(.Xr,N.'.:_1,wr ,l)EAl} 
q:�N-i.a-1,T = J Fu(dwu' eu•' N�1) = 1 - q:�N-1,s-1,T 
{wu:m(.xu,N�1,wu,/)EA3} 
where (er•, eu•) are the true values of (Or, eu) known to the government.
4 Aggregate Dynamics
The probability transition matrix for each individual given her own history and belief is 
fully defined by the probability transition matrix Q derived in the previous section. For 
the government who knows the true values of er and eu' this is the building block for 
working towards an optimal subsidy and tax policy. We assume that the actual wage 
values observed by the agents as well as their initial beliefs are private knowledge that is 
not available to the government. 
As a starting point, let's assume that at some time period t, the government's belief 
about the beliefs ,xr and ,xu of a typical agent is described by µt = (µ;r, µ;u, µfr, µr), 
where µ!i is the government's belief in period t about the -Xi for a randomly chosen agent
in sector i; for i = r, u, and j = r, u. In what follows, we shall suppress the depen­
dence of the transition probabilities on s_1 and r in the notation, but that dependence 
should be remembered. We can then define the aggregate transition probability from the 
government's point of view when it has belief µt by:
n 
L: Prµt{i individuals r--+ u, (m - n + i) individuals u --+  r, the rest remain }i=O 
Prµt{N[ = n} 
= t[( j j q;�,_xu µ;r(d.\r) µ;u(d.\u))
i
1-0 �(er) !P(eu) 
xf j j q�;»· µ;'(dA') µ;"(dA")r �(er) llJ(eu) 
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X ( J J q:;•A" µ;'(d,\') µ�"(d,\">f-n+<\(er) i.p(eu) 
xf j j q::·A" µ�'(d,\') µ�"(d,\"r-m-<ll  Prµ, {N; = n)\(er) i.p(eu) 
Where k ---+ 1 stands for migrating from sector k to sector l. The collection of these terms
yields the aggregate population transition matrix: 
( T.µ1 T.l'I )
00 ON 
Tl'I - • • • r1� . : : T�N
where the belief µt is given. Starting with some initial belief µo, it only remains to specify 
the rule for updating µt into µt+1 
· 
Let the government have current belief µt, decide on the migration tax Tt, and then 
observe the migration for period t. Let N[_1 = n and N[ = m, and let k agents migrate
from r to u (and hence m - n + k migrate from u tor), the government then updates
its beliefs from µt to µt+I = (µrf.11 µrf.1, µf.+.11 µf.t1), and then chooses the subsidy levels 
sr' sf and the migration tax Tt+J. The updating rule from µt to µt+
1 is done in four steps: 
Step 1 updates the government's belief about the typical ,\'s in both sectors before 
the actual migration in period t took place. In other words it only takes care of 
updating based on the intentions to migrate. 
Step 2 updates taking into consideration the government's knowledge of the true 
(er•,eu•), and knowing that the ,\'s will have to change once the wages and popula­
tion frequencies are observed by the agents. The first two steps still do not take into 
consideration the mixing up of the populations from the two sectors via migration, 
and the resulting contamination of their beliefs. 
Step 3 computes the government's beliefs about the typical belief of those from the 
two populations who will choose to migrate, and those who choose not to. 
Step 4 will add the contamination of the migrants' beliefs to the non-migants' and 
achieves the next period's beliefs µt+I· 
In the following, ·let A·c �(fY)· and B c �(eu).
Step!: 
In this step, the µ�i's are updated to the Slii's which take into consideration what
the µ�; should have been had the government known what the next period population
distribution will be. 
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Step2: 
In this step, we take the Sl ii 's and update them by taking into consideration the
possible wage draws that could have occurred (remember the government knows the true 
(Or*, (JU*)), and how the agents are expected to change their beliefs accordingly. 
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Step 3: 
In this step, as in Step 1, we use Bayes' theorem. For instance, the first term s3;-r(A) 
stands for the probability that >.r will fall in the set A for an individual who was in sector 
r, and decided to stay in sector r. We then use Bayes' theorem as follows: 
S3r-+r(A) _ p { , r Al . } _ Pr{ agent stays in r J
>.r EA} x Pr{>.r EA} 
r - r "' E agent stays m r - p { . }r agent stays m r 
Similarly, all the other terms S3�-i (.) can be derived as the government's belief regarding
the distribution of beliefs about Ok among the agents who migrated from sector i to sector
J: 
f f q;;.>." s2rr(d>.r) s2ru(d>.u) x s2rr(A)
53r-.r (A) = _A _lll(_e _") _  -..,....--.,.--------r f f q;;.>." s2rr(d>.r) s2ru(d>.u)
llJ(0r) llJ(0") 
f J q;�·>." s2rr(d>.r) s2ru(d>.u) x s2rr(A)
53r-tu(A) - A_llJ_(_e"_) _ ----:-::,....,....,,--------r f f q;�·>." s2rr(d>.r) s2ru(d>.u) 
llJ(Sr) llJ(8") 
f J q:;•>." s2ur(d>.r) s2uu(d>.u) x s2ur(A)
S3u-.r(A) _A __ lll .;._(e-'") ________ ___ _ r - f f q�;.>." s2ur(d>n s2uu(d>.u) 
llJ(er) llJ(0") 
f f q�:·>." s2ur(d>.r) s2uu(d>.u) x s2ur(A)
53u-tu( A) = _A _lll(_e_ " )-----..,.--...,..---------r J f 'J��,).u s2ur(d.Xr) s2uu{d_\U) 
llJ(er) llJ(0") 
f f q;;.>." S2rr(d>.r) S2ru(d).u) X S2ru(B)
53r-tr (B) = !ll _( _er....;..) _B __ -...,.,::'""':"":':'" _______ _ u f f q;;•>." s2rr(d>.r) s2ru(d>.u)
llJ(er) llJ(0") 
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Step 4: 
J J q�·>." s2rr(d>-.r) s2ru(d.Xu) x s2ru(B)
33r-+u(B) - !P_('-- e-'-r)_B ____________ _ 
ti J J q;�·>." s2rr(d.Xr) s2ru(d.Xtt) 
!J.l(0r) !J_l(eu) 
J I q�;,>.u s2ur(d;\r) s2uu(d;\U) x s2uu(B)
33u-+r (B) - _!P(_e_r)_B _ _..,...--.-,------ --u I I q�;,>.u s2ur(d.-\r) s2uu(d.-\u)
!J_l(0r) !J.l(0U) 
I I q�:·).U s2ur(d;\r) s2uu(d;\U) x s2uu(B)
33u-+u( B) - !P_(_e-'r)_B __ --.-...,..---------u - I I q��·>." s2ur(d.-\r) s2uu(d.-\U)
!J.l(0r) !J_l(0U) 
Now, we are ready to compute the beliefs µt+1 with the contaminations of the beliefs 
of those who decided to stay behind by those who decided to migrate. 
µur (A) = N 
- m - k 33u-+U(A) + k 33r-+U(A)t+I N - m r N - m r 
µuu (B) = N
- m - k 33u-+u(B) + k 33r-+u(B) t+I N - m u N - m u 
We summarize this entire updating rule by the notation: 
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5 The Government's Decision Problem
Now, given the transition matrix Tµ1 and the updating rule from µt to µt+l, the govern­
ment's decision problem can be properly specified. Let the government's revenue from 
migration taxes in period t be Rt = 2:�1 Ttll; - 1L11. We assume that the government 
has a time-separable welfare function to maximize: 
h ... ( l,r N[,r 1,u N;",u) ... ( r r u u) 'th Nr f th fi tw ere Wt = Wt , .. ., Wt , wt , ... , Wt , St = st, .. ., st, st , .. ., st w1 t o e rs 
term and Ntu of the second, and mt is a vector whose ith element is Ttll; - !L1 I· The 
utility function U is assumed increasing in its arguments (each individual's consumption
for each period), and the utility function Q is assumed to be increasing in its arguments 
(the budget surplus). 
The Government has as its control the wage subsidies ( s�, sn to be distributed at the
end of the current period, and the migration tax Tt+i to be collected from agents who 
decide to migrate int+ 1. The state variable is defined by the pair (µt, N[). The optimal 
tax and subsidy problem can be written as follows: 
s.t. 
Pr{Nt+i = mlNtu = n} = T/::n 
µt = �µ(µt-ti N[_1, N[) 
The value function for this problem is defined by: 
N[ N-N[ 
+8 L L Pr{ exactly k migrate r --tu, and l migrate u --tr}
k=O l=O 
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is recursively well defined and admits a measurable optimal subsidy and tax function
(N[, µt) � (s�,sf,Tt+i)· 
Remarks 
• The existence of the value function V, and the optimal subsidy and tax function,
again follows since the government's dynamic program has a metric state space with
a weakly continuous transition kernel (due to the continuity of steps 1 through 4
of Bayesian updating from µt to µt+i), and a compact control space [O, s] x [O, f].
Again see Easley and Kiefer {1988), or El-Gamal and Sundaram (1993) for detailed
proofs of technically identical results.
• If we assume that the government observes the actual empirical distribution of
wages for the agents, then S2 .can be computed much more simply without having
to integrate over all wages that could have been observed.
• If there is only one realized wage that is paid to all the workers in a given sector,
then the government's decision problem will be much simpler with the vectors Wt
containing only two distinct terms wt and wf.
• We could have chosen to constrain the government to commit to (st, sf) at the
same time it chooses Tt, i.e. before the agents choose whether or not to migrate.
However, this would limit the government's ability to correct instantaneous welfare
losses due to errors in its choice of Tt resulting in over- or under-migration and a
poor distribution of wages. The choice of the subsidies, however, also influences the
agents' beliefs and their migration patterns in the future (which is implicit in the
government's dynamic program) , and hence is not a costless fine-tuning parameter
to maximize instantaneous welfare.
• The migration tax can serve the purpose of migration restriction in the original
Harris-Todaro model. A sufficiently high migration tax can make the probability
that any agent can afford to pay it (by getting a sufficiently high wage draw) as
small as the government wishes. In the Harris-Todaro framework where the support
of Fr(., er•, Nr ) is the two points zero and the minimum wage w, setting Tt > w
will be sufficient to stop migration from r to u. 
• In the classical Harris-Todaro model, and its offspring, the problem is usually seen
as one of unemployment in the urban sector. The setting there is static, but if
we see it as the setting for each period of our dynamic model, it would make the
distribution F"'(.,·or,Nr) degenerate at some rural wage wr(Nr ), and the distribu­
tion Fu(., eu, Nu ) would have two atoms at 0 (unemployment) , and wu(Nu)  which
is bound to be greater than or equal to some minimum wage w. Notice that full
information is available to the workers in this framework (the O's do not influence
the wage distribution in either sector). This framework is equivalent to all agents
having correct degenerate beliefs >. r = er•' and >. u = eu•. In that framework, the
instantaneous welfare effects of the subsidy and migration tax (equalling 0, or a
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number larger than wr (Nr ), and hence serving as a tool for migration restriction)
are identical to those of the traditional Harris-Todaro studies (where W (.),pr (. )
and Fu(.) are chosen appropriately). In our (dynamic) framework, however, the 
effects of policies on beliefs (and hence on future migration) have to be taken into 
consideration. 
6 Comparative Dynamics and Policy Analysis
In this section, we introduce two rather inoccuous simplifying assumptions, and study 
the effect of the parameters of the model on the micro and macro-dynamics of migration,
and the optimal policy variables. We shall use i and j for generic reference to the sectors
r and u. The two assumptions are: 
(A.1) Let() E JR, and let Fi(dw;O, N) stochastically dominate Fi(dw;</J, N) for() >.</>, 
for i = r, u.
(A.2) Let the agent's utility function u(.) , and the government's utility function U(.) +
Q (. ) be strictly concave. 
The assumption (A.1) allows us to have a complete ordering of potential distributions 
of wages in the two sectors which allows us to introduce the notion of monotonicity of 
various variables of interest as a function of the agent beliefs. Assumption (A.2) insures 
the single-valuedness (and hence continuity) of the optimal policy for the agent's as well 
as the government's problem. We are now ready to analyze the effect of the various 
parameters of our model on the dynamics and policy variables under (A.1) and (A.2). 
First, we establish some monotonicity properties for the micro and macro-dynamics 
of our model: 
•For a given individual residing in sector i, iffor a fixed >..'i(dOi) = >..i(dOi), and for
fixed population distributions and goverment policy variables, )/i ( d()i) stochasti­
cally dominates >..i ( d()i), then the probability of migration from i to j, q��,N-1'8-1'7 >
q�t-i.8-1'7• This follows immediately from the definition of events E1-E4 which de­
fined the agent's optinal migration rule in section 3. As the probability of staying
in i is one minus the probability of migrating to j, the probability of staying in i 
decreases as the belief on ()i increases (in the sense of stochastic dominance). If the
individual resided in sector. j ,. then. the. pmbability of staying in j increases, and
the probability of migrating to i declines.
• Similarly, if >..'i (.) stochastically dominates >.. i (.), while everything else stays fixed,
the probability of migration from j to i and the probability of staying in i increase,
while the probability of staying in j and the probability of migrating from i to j
decrease. This establishes the monotonicity of the individual migrant's migration
probability in that agent's beliefs.
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• Holding everything else constant, ifs� increases, the probability of migration from
j to i and the probability of staying in i increase, while the probability of migrating
from i to j and the probability of staying in j decrease. Again, this can be seen by
inspecting events E1-E4 of section 3. Notice that si only enters the value function
additively to wi. Hence, given the agent always believes that s�+l = s�, an increase
in s� has the same effect on the values of staying and migrating as an increase
in >. i(. ) (in the sense of stochastic dominance). By the previous argument, the
monotonicity of the migration properties in the subsidy levels is also established.
• If r increases, the probability of migration in either direction decreases, and the
probability of staying in the individual's current sector increases. This again can
be seen from events E1-E4 where r enters as a one-time shock to the individual's
value function in the event of migration. The effect of inhibiting migration is further
multiplied by the fact that the individual expects r to stay at its high level, so if
after migration, the individual regrets the previous period's decision and decides to
migrate again, she will have to pay the same (higher) tax again.
• Finally, as /3 increases, the probability of migration increases. This follows imme­
diately since. the payoff from migration is always weighted by the discount factor
/3 whereas the migration tax has to be payed instantly (and hence affects current
utility).
So far, we have established the monotonicity properties of the individual migration 
rules (and hence the macro-dynamics as well) in the policy variables �, s1 and Tt+i· We 
now establish the possibility of the need for goverment intervention, regardless of how 
long the economy has been running. We establish the possibility that agents may refrain 
from migration when it is advantageous to them simply because of erroneous beliefs. 
• In the absence of government intervention, assume that there exists a {;i such that
pi ( dw; ()i, N) stochastically dominates pi ( dw; Oi, N') for all (Ji, N, N'. Then there
exists a belief >. = ( >. i, ).i) with ).i sufficiently concentrated around {;i such that an
agent with that belief will always migrate from j to i, and will never migrate back
from i to j, regardless of the sequence of wage draws and migration patterns that
person observes. This follows directly from the weak continuity of the individual's
value function in her belief, together with the continuity of the Bayes updating
map. Our individual will immediately want to migrate to i if she happens to be in
j, getting at most one observation on ()i, which is not sufficient to move her belief
far enough from {;i to warrant experimenting by migrating hack .to j, regardless of
how bad the situation may be in i.
The government intervention can in our extreme case, as well as more moderate cases, 
influence the decision of subjects to migrate, learn, and in the long run, be sufficiently 
informed to obtain a socially optimal distribution. In the special case where {;i made 
sector j look extremely unattractive to some agents, the government can increase s� 
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sufficiently to shift the distribution of wi up and invite the workers to sample enough 
data points to get their beliefs closer to the correct parameter ()i*. Of course, the cost of 
enforcing that learning (in terms of the budget deficit that needs to be generated) may 
be too high to make it worth pursuing. Instead of making further restrictive assumptions 
and analyzing how the government's optimal policy will vary with the current population 
distribution N[ and beliefs µt, we argue for solving the government's dynamic program
in any case of interest, and studying the optimal policy rule for that case. The following 
section introduces a numerical parametrization of the model, and solves the various 
components of the agents' and government's problems. 
7 Numerical Example
In this section, we shall solve a simple parametric example of our model. The framework 
of our example will be as close as one can get to the Harris-Todaro world without losing 
the uncertainty and dynamic components of our model. We let er = {1, 2} and eu =
{4, 8}. Beliefs on (Jr and ou are simply represented by real numbers)/= Pr{fJr = 1} 
and ). u = Pr{ ou = 4}. We assume that we have a population N = 100. The discount
factor for our agents is /3 = 0.25, and their utility function is u( c) = JC. 
To mimic of the Harris-Todaro world, let the wage in the rural sector be determined 
in each period by 
and 
wtr = _.!__ if or = 1N[ 
with prob. 1/2; 
with prob. 1/2 
if or = 2. All workers in the rural sector receive the same wage. The true value of or is 
1, and hence, the wages are a deterministic function of the population, but the agents 
have beliefs that it may be a stochastic function. Notice that had or been equal to 2, 
one draw of the high wage would have been enough to learn the true parameter in sector 
r instantly, but in our example, all non-zero beliefs will still be positive after observing 
the wage. 
In the urban sector, there is a maximum of 50 jobs available, and any extra workers 
living in that s�ctor are unemployed. As in the Harris-Todaro model, the total population 
of the urban sector Nr is in each period randomly allocated with equal probability to be 
employed or unemployed. For those who are. em ployed,. the wage is determined by 
and 
w�emp = 4 if ou = 4min(50, Nr) 
uemp _ { min(S�1N;')' Wt - 8 min(SO,N;')' 
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with prob. 1/2; 
with prob. 1/2 
if ev. = 8. Each worker is employed with probability min(l, 50/Ntu), and all employed 
workers get the same wage. The true value of ev. is 4. Notice again that this makes the 
expected wage in the urban sector (probability of getting employment times the urban 
wage w�emp) a deterministic function of Ntv., but the workers have beliefs that there is a
chance of getting twice that much if ov. = 8. Again given the current configuration, total 
learning of the true value of ev. will not occur in finite time. 
7 .1 The agent's problem and micro-dynamics 
Under no government intervention, s'.:..1 = s�1 = T = O. Now, for the current period, let
Nr = 30 (and Nu = 70), then we can solve (by iterating on the Bellman equation) for 
the worker's value function (of section 2) for being in the rural sector, being in the urban 
sector and employed, or being in the urban sector and unemployed during this period. 
Those three value functions are shown in Figures 2, 3, and 4 respectively. The value 
functions were obtained by iterating on the contraction mapping on a grid of 21 x 21 
points until the sum of the absolute maximum difference between the iterates of the three 
value functions was smaller than 5 x 10-10• This target was reached after 19 iterations.
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Figure 2: Value function for an agent in sector r 
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Figure 3: Value function for an employed Figure 4: Value function for an unemployed 
agent in sector u agent ·in-sector u 
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This in turn allows us to compute the probabilities of agents migrating as a function 
of their beliefs. Figures 5 and 6 show the probabilities q;�,>.u and q�;,>.u respectively (the
probability of an agent in r with any given beliefs migrating to u, and the probability of
an agent in u with any given beliefs migrating tor, resp. ) .
lambda"u 
lambda"r 
Ol 0 1 
Figure 5: Probability of an agent in sector r Figure 6: Probability of an agent in sector u 
migrating to u migrating to r 
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7 .2 Aggregate dynamics, and government's beliefs 
Now we can move on to the aggregate dynamics, and solving the government's welfare 
maximization problem. Let the government be completely uninformed about the beliefs 
of the agents during this period, and hence assign the beliefs: µrr = µru = µfr = µr = 
U([O, 1]). Then we can compute the probability of N[+I moving to any given value given
that N[ = 30 (notice that in this example, the government actually knows the exact
empirical wage distribution in t by simply knowing N[). The probabilities T:fo,m are
displayed in Figure 7. The chosen values are again in the spirit of the Harris-Todaro 
world with 20 unemployed in the urban sector, and the expected wage differential being 
large enough to induce even further migration to the urban sector. 
We can now proceed to study the aggregate dynamics from the government's point 
of view. For instance, if period t witnesses 10 agents migrating from r to u, and 2 
agents migrating from u to r, then, we can go through the four steps of updating the
government's prior from µt which is uniform over [O, 1], to the beliefs shown in the four
histograms in Figures 8-11. 
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Figure 7: The probability of N[+I = m given N[ = 30
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7 .3 The Government's Optimal Policy Function 
Let the government's utility function U(ci, ... , cN) = L:f:1 u(ci) = L:f:1 fo, and let
Q( surplus) = surplus. We can now - in principle - solve our government's value function
(of section 5) by iterating on the functional equation in the same manner we used to 
solve the individual's dynamic program. In the general case, this is a rather complicated 
procedure where the government's own belief µt is a state variable since it makes the
value function very highly dimensional if we maintain any reasonable degree of accuracy. 
To illustrate the solution, we solve for the government's optimal policy as a function of 
N[, the current population distribution, in a special case where the government's value 
function does not depend on µt {by assuming that the government does not update its
beliefs µt)· The solution discussed below was implemented by solving for the agents'
optimal migration rules for all possible values of N[ in the same manner discussed earlier 
in this section. We then iterate on the government's value function (with µt fixed at the 
uniform distribution) until the difference between two iterates was less than 5 x 10-6, 
this took 15 iterations and approximately 4400 CPU seconds on the Cray YMP2E/116. 
We consider the case where 6 = {3 = 0.25, and the government does not update
its beliefs, i.e. µ�i = U[O, 1). The government still cares about migration patterns,
however, since they affect the lifetime payoffs of the subjects. Figures 12-15 show
the government's value function, and the optimal s; E {0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25},
sf E {0.0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25} and Tt+t E {O.O, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5} respectively as a 
function of N[, for that special case. We can see from Figure 12 that the government is 
able to maintain a flat value function for most population distributions by distributing
wage subsidies and financing them through migration taxes. The subsidies s; and s� are
monotone increasing in the populations N[ and Nr respectively, and the migration tax 
is fixed at 0.1 for all but the very extreme population distributions. 
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